## Case 1:14-cr-00272-JSR Document 242 Filed 03/22/16 Page 1 of 68

G3AFALL1 Sentence UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 4 14 CR 272 (JSR) V. 5 ANTHONY ALLEN AND ANTHONY CONTI, 6 Defendants. 7 -----x 8 New York, N.Y. 9 March 10, 2016 4:15 p.m. 10 11 Before: 12 HON. JED S. RAKOFF, 13 District Judge 14 **APPEARANCES** 15 UNITED STATES DEPT. OF JUSTICE Criminal Division 16 BRIAN YOUNG 17 CAROL SIPPERLY MICHAEL KOENIG 18 Assistant United States Attorney WILKIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP 19 Attorneys for Defendant Allen 20 MICHAEL SCHACHTER, ESQ. CASEY DONNELLY, ESQ. 21 TOR EKELAND, PC 22 Attorneys for Defendant Conti TOR EKELAND, ESQ. 23 AARON WILLIAMSON, ESQ. 24 25

1 (Case called)

(In open court)

THE DEPUTY CLERK: March 10, 2016. This is United States v. Anthony Allen, docket number 14 CR 272, defendant number 5. Will everyone please be seated and will the parties please identify themselves for the record.

MR. YOUNG: Good afternoon, your Honor. Brian Young, Carol Sipperly, and Michael Koenig for the United States. With us at counsel table is Christopher Neary, our paralegal.

MR. SCHECHTER: Michael Shechter and Casey Donnelly for Mr. Allen, who is present in court.

MR. EKELAND: Good afternoon, your Honor, Aaron Williamson and Tor Ekeland on behalf of Anthony Conti, who is also present.

THE COURT: Good afternoon. We're here for sentence. I want to say before we start the difficult work ahead of us that I am very grateful to all counsel in this case for their really superb work throughout this case, but not least in the presentation of their memoranda for sentencing and other submissions for sentencing, all of which were extremely helpful to the Court.

I think for purposes of loss calculation, which we'll get to in a moment and other guideline calculations, I'll hear from counsel for both defendants, but then we're going to bifurcate and deal first with the sentence for Mr. Allen and

then the sentence for Mr. Conti, because these are two separate individuals and they need to be separately considered. But there was common themes on the loss calculation and on the guideline calculation where there were objections made, so I'll hear from both counsel just on that portion of the colloquy.

I am required by federal law to calculate a guideline range for each defendant and I am required to do that before we do anything else and so I will carry out that obligation. But I want to make clear at the outset and it will come as no surprise to any of the counsel in this case that the guideline calculation will have little or no effect on my sentences. The guidelines in this Court's view are inherently flawed, irrational, unreasonable and nowhere is that more shown than in this very case.

There's a debate which we're about to hear fleshed out, though it's already in the papers, over the loss calculation, and if the loss were as the defendants believed, namely, zero, then the sentencing guideline range would be zero to seven months. And if the loss calculation was as the probation officer, who also did a splendid job, were to be adopted, then the guideline range jumps, because loss is the single biggest factor, approximately 50 percent of the calculation, jumps up to many years. I think for Mr. Allen it jumps to 87 to 104 months. And if, as the government asserts the real effective loss was even much larger, not perhaps in a

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24 25 technical sense but in a sense that the Court is urged to consider, then we jump right up to life in prison. And all of this is in a situation in which both sides, both the defendants and the government, are agreed that on the particular facts of this case it's rather difficult to calculate loss. impossible I don't think, but certainly far from an easy task.

So there we have the mighty sentencing guidelines proclaiming in effect that the sentence of these two defendants could under a certainly not impossible calculation of the quidelines be anywhere from zero months in jail to lifetime imprisonment and that all in a situation where loss is, as the parties agree, difficult to calculate.

To my mind that speaks to the utter poverty of the guidelines; their inherent irrationality, their complete insignificance in achieving justice and I will calculate as I'm required to do the guidelines, but I give you that temperate statement in advance so that you know that my sentence will not be materially affected by the guidelines.

All right. So, let's talk first about the calculation of the loss which the presentence report, adopting essentially the government's expert position, puts at \$1,149,671.76, thus creating the illusion of precision in an area where all sides agree precision is impossible.

So let me hear from defense counsel, since you believe that's not a reasonable calculation.

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MR. SCHECHTER: Thank you, your Honor. And to be clear, although your Honor referred to the FBI accountant as an expert, I think the government does not put forward this individual as an expert. In fact, it is the government's position that this is simply mathematical computations that any witness could, any lay witness could perform and they have not submitted any kind of expert analysis at least as that term is known by the Federal Rules of Evidence.

Your Honor, the intended loss under the new revision to the guidelines effective in November limits the calculation of intended loss to the amount of pecuniary harm the government is able to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the defendant purposely sought to inflict. It is limited to his subjective intent. It is the amount, it is to be calculated the amount that the government proves the defendant had a conscious object to cause. The Sentencing Commission specifically considered the question as to where intended loss should be limited to the amount that the defendant purposely intended or whether it should also include amounts that may have been intended by other participants in jointly undertaken activity. Although that was the position that was urged by the Justice Department, that position was rejected by the Sentencing Commission. So it is limited, this exercise is limited to determining what is the amount, is there an amount that can be calculated as the specific amount of loss that

Mr. Allen purposely sought to inflict, and in this circumstance, and I should say it even is clear under the Sentencing Commission's pronouncement that he's not responsible for losses that he might have possibly or potentially contemplated, the Sentencing Commission says that's to be excluded as well from the calculation of intended loss.

It is stipulated among the parties that Mr. Allen had no knowledge of any of the particular swaps that were the subjects of whatever requests had been made in this case. He doesn't know the size of the swap, wouldn't know who the counter party was, and would not know what amount, if any, was to be caused.

In addition, Mr. Allen himself received only 16 requests. He responded to only four and the government found that one of those four was followed by a submission which, according to their analysis, was inconsistent with the request that was received. So it's just three of the four to which he responded they believe that, even the government believes the submission was consistent with the request.

In calculating intended loss, the government we submit ignores the sentencing guidelines and looks instead at 201 requests and analyzes -- does some analysis to determine what is the possible loss which may have resulted to counter parties from those 201 requests.

THE COURT: So why -- I know they group this under

intended loss, but why isn't this a reasonable approximation of actual loss where actual loss does include reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm?

MR. SCHECHTER: That's true. Still, your Honor, it is, it is methodology that they have gone about to calculate some amount of -- first of all, the government I don't think does take the position that this is an approximation of actual loss.

THE COURT: No, but I've got an independent duty to do
the best I can to figure out what the loss is and if actual
loss is a better measure than intended loss I should adopt
that. No one claims in this case but just to show the problem
if actual gain were a better measure or a fallback measure
because you couldn't calculate loss then I would adopt that.
So looking at it as actual loss, reasonably estimate. It's not
a perfect analysis, but why isn't this actual loss?

MR. SCHECHTER: I think the government stipulates they have no ability to calculate actual loss.

THE COURT: I'm taking the methodology they use and putting a different, if you will, gloss on it and why isn't it a reasonable way to determine actual loss?

MR. SCHECHTER: I guess I will first note that of course the government bears the burden of proof here and I think the government submits that they can't meet that burden. Putting that aside I'll respond to the Court's question. The

methodology is completely flawed. They have no -- they could have, I suppose, gone to the counter parties and said, okay, here's the trading information, what loss did you suffer on that particular day. It would have been -- I don't know that that would have been difficult to do, and they could have then submitted some approximation of the actual loss. They chose not to --

THE COURT: That's right, but I guess what prompts this question from the Court is the guidelines say actual loss means the reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the offense, so in some ways, in just another example of "guideline-ese," they're mixing up intended loss and actual loss and applying the language that you think would be part of intended loss to actual loss and eschewing it from the definition of intended loss. But, hey, they'll do what they want.

MR. SCHECHTER: Yes, well — I think there's a bunch of loss. First and foremost the government has no ability and didn't even attempt in the course of this trial to say that the LIBOR submissions were inaccurate or would have been different had there not been a request. And so we don't know and the government, we have no, sitting here, we have no knowledge, the government has offered no evidence that the LIBOR submission on any given day would have been different had there not been a request. In fact, they include in this list of 200 requests,

114 that their own analysis, where their own analysis showed that the submission was inconsistent with the request that was received and yet, in order to, I submit to get the number as high as possible, they include requests in their calculation for which they don't even believe there's evidence that the submission, that there was any attention paid to the submission.

THE COURT: So going back to intended loss, your client and his co-defendant attempted to rig the LIBOR rate in such a way that it would be otherwise than it would have been and that was for the purpose of gaining benefits at their end which would then be ipso facto detriments at the other end. So if we were able to calculate from using that approach, wouldn't it be a lot more than a million dollars?

MR. SCHECHTER: Well, your Honor, I think part of the problem is that, and it's an issue with the sentencing guidelines as your Honor pointed out. This is just, there is just not a way that one can — the sentencing guidelines are not that helpful, particularly under the unique circumstances of this case. I will guarrel with one —

THE COURT: I totally agree with that.

MR. SCHECHTER: I will quarrel with one statement made by your Honor. Your Honor said that for their end. And to be clear, this is, as we said in our submissions, this is a very unique set of facts. Your Honor has tremendous amounts of

experience, has seen many, many criminal cases, defended them, prosecuted them. I submit that this, there is nothing like this particular case when your Honor said to help their end, in fact, it's also, there is no dispute that this was not for their end, that there was no personal gain --

THE COURT: No, no, I didn't mean a personal gain, but to help their customers, to help their bank. They weren't doing it as sleepwalkers. They had a reason for doing it.

MR. SCHECHTER: It is relatively rare that there is a criminal offense brought before the Court where there is no personal gain, there is no motive for the offense. It happens I think there's — but it separates this case from certainly a vast majority of fraud cases that your Honor sees. I'll address that at a different time with the Court's permission.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. SCHECHTER: But on the subject of the application of the guidelines, if one is simply to apply the terms of the guidelines, there is no calculable intended loss. There is no evidence that Mr. Allen -- certainly the jury found, in all likelihood that there was a point in time, perhaps the jury's verdicts could be based on one of the four e-mails that he responded to that he chose one estimate of borrowing costs over another with, mindful of what was going to be helpful to his employer. That doesn't allow us to come to a calculation of what loss, if any, he intended. And so I think just from a

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pure application of 2B1.1 there is no loss that the government, no intended loss that the government is able to establish.

There's many flaws in the methodology. I can take the Court through them if that would be --

THE COURT: Well, I assume you are alluding to your papers and I've read your papers carefully so why don't we put that on hold at least for the moment.

Let me hear from co-counsel before we go to the government.

MR. WILLIAMSON: Your Honor, as co-counsel points out the intended loss numbers are based on -- the majority of the requests taken into account by the government's analysis were requests to the government's witness, Paul Robson, and there's been no evidence that my client was aware of those specific requests or possibly could have intended, specifically intended any harm caused by them. I would also point out that the government, the government's analysis assumed that the defendants intended to move LIBOR by one basis point every time they received a request. I don't believe there's evidence in the record for that. Their assumption that it's one -- their argument that one basis point is a reasonable number because there were sometimes requests to move the number by more than that, but every communication reflecting such a request is, again, a request to Mr. Robson and again there's no evidence that my client was aware of requests that specifically asked

for movement of a certain number of basis points and so I would submit that one basis point is not necessarily a reasonable or a conservative estimate. And that's all I have.

THE COURT: All right.

(Continued next page)

MR. SCHACHTER: May I make one other point, one flaw of the methodology I wish to emphasize. The government's analysis also concludes that, in reaching this one eighth of a basis point, we are going to assume that every single time there was a request that LIBOR was affected by one eighth of a basis point because the submission was affected by one basis point.

It ignores a submission by KPMG, which we have attached to our papers, which concluded that more than 50 percent of the time, Rabobank's submission was kicked out of the eight middle grades. Therefore, whether the impact, whether the request was impacted by one basis point or two basis points or half a basis point, in more than half of those instances, it wouldn't have had — certainly there is no basis to conclude it would have had a one eighth of a basis point effect.

There is many flaws in the methodology, that is my point.

THE COURT: Let me hear from the government.

MR. YOUNG: Judge, I think it was in 2008, Lee Stewart got into a fight with Damon Robbins on the trading floor about Rabobank's submission that day.

While it may be difficult to quantify loss in this case, I think it is clear that Lee Stewart was upset because he knew that it was money at stake, and the purpose of the scheme

was to make money at the expense of a counterpart.

THE COURT: I agree with that, but the technical problem we have -- frankly, that fact looms in my mind far more importantly than any of the stuff we are going through right now -- but the guidelines say I have to calculate loss.

MR. YOUNG: Here is the best way we can think of to do it. We thought, we took written submissions, written requests -- I think there were 200 something of them -- on those days we assumed -- that doesn't include verbal requests, which is how they generally communicated -- on those days we assumed that the requester wanted to move Rabobank's submission by at least one basis point, by one basis point. We know that often they asked for more.

If they were successful in moving Rabobank's submission by one basis point, that would cause at least a one eighth change in the fix. So our baseline assumption is every time somebody asks the Rabobank's submitter to change the Rabobank's submission on their behalf, though intended to cause a one eighth basis point change in the overall LIBOR effects on those specific dates, we found out what Rabobank's positions were vis-a-vis on the counterparties, assumed the movement adverse to the counterparty by one eighth of a basis point, and that is how we got 1.139 million or whatever we came up with. That is the best way that we can think about doing it.

But I would submit --

THE COURT: Built into that are all sorts of assumptions that are really just -- you call them reasonable estimates, someone might call them specifications.

MR. YOUNG: We have to do the best that we can. Under this circumstance, it turns out that the defendants have committed a crime that just makes it very difficult to quantify the loss that they caused.

THE COURT: All the more reason why the guidelines don't really fit this situation very well, assuming they fit any situation well. My own view is this. I think it is a very close call.

I think, in the end, under all the facts and circumstances, the government's approach — flawed though it is, more speculative it is in numerous respects — is not so unreasonable that it can't be adopted by the court. I want to stress again how irrelevant all of this is to my sentence. My sentence would be the same, the same, if instead of the loss of 1.14967, 1.76, or it was zero. Zero, that's really not the right way to put it. It was incalculable. No one knew what it was. It does not affect my sentence.

I do think when all is said and done, the government came up with something that was not unreasonable, and so I will adopt that. The calculation, now you will notice again how absurd the result is. This adds 14 points to the guideline range. The guideline range for the defendants is approximately

twice that amount. We are talking about 50 percent of the guideline calculation is based on what is, at best, questionable approach to calculation, though not an unreasonable one, I so find.

Let's go on to the two-point increase involving ten or more victims. Let me hear from defense counsel on that.

MR. SCHACHTER: Your Honor, our argument is the same as laid out in our papers. They did not prove any actual loss that was sustained by any victim that was caused by Mr. Allen. In fact, I believe that probation found that there was no pecuniary loss to any victim, and on that basis, there is no basis for the two-level enhancement.

THE COURT: Your view is that, for example, is as some of the witnesses in the trial who said if we had known this was going on, we never would have invested, they are not, for these purposes, a victim, even though they are in some sense a victim?

MR. SCHACHTER: Yes. Because the guidelines define victims to be someone who sustains a monetary harm. None of those witnesses were able to say they sustained a monetary harm.

THE COURT: I wanted to be clear on that point, that what I understood in your submission, anything you wanted to add.

MR. WILLIAMSON: One point, your Honor.

The government's actual loss calculation was based on the assumption that when Paul Robson, again, quote, was requested to make a particular submission, and after having a been asked where he thought LIBOR would sit that day, that when he quoted to the requester a number that a broker had told him earlier in the day, that that necessarily would have been the number that he would have submitted, absent a request.

I consider that also speculative, your Honor. I think that sort of speculation is less supportable in an actual loss calculation.

THE COURT: Let me hear from the government.

MR. YOUNG: Judge, I think this is a similar analysis to what we just talked about. However, in these three instances, what we did was look at three chats where Mr. Robson, or whoever the submitter was, indicated a number that he was thinking of before the request, changed the number after the request.

So those instances, we could go back and see how much the LIBOR fix changed that date. That is what we did. We did the counterfactual LIBOR effects. We affected ten different financial institutions. I mean, I guess it is technically true that Mr. Robson didn't say, I intend to submit X on this day, but he did say brokers are telling me X, and then he submitted X plus five.

THE COURT: One could draw the inference.

MR. YOUNG: Judge, we had submit on the papers beyond that.

THE COURT: I do think -- although I think, again, there are problems with the analysis -- but I think it is a little stronger than the loss calculation, so I will do the two-point increase.

I don't need to hear further argument on the other points. I think there was an abuse of a position of trust, and I know the arguments that are made against that. I agree with the government's position there.

I also agree, in Mr. Allen's case, that he orchestrated a scheme that involved five or more participants, etc., so there is the four-point adjustment for role.

In the case of Mr. Allen, now we will just focus on Mr. Allen for a few minutes, and then come to Mr. Conti later.

The court determines that the offense level is 29, the criminal history category is Roman numeral I, and the guideline range is therefore 87 to 108 months.

Now that we have gotten that stuff out of the way,
let's talk about the real issues. Let me hear first from
Mr. Allen's counsel, then from the government, on what sentence
I should impose, taking account of the statute that I do think
makes a lot of sense, Section 3553(a) of Title 18.

MR. SCHACHTER: Your Honor, the 165 letters that were submitted to the court --

THE COURT: Which the court found very valuable, and in some cases pointed, and I am very grateful to you for having submitted those.

MR. SCHACHTER: Your Honor, we submit that they show the court that Mr. Allen is a very, very good and kind person with two small children who need him. His daughter Fay, who is five years old, will need serious surgery in the near term and, your Honor, needs her father with her.

Mr. Allen's loving partner of 25 years, Tracy, who was present in the United States with Mr. Allen throughout the trial, and is here today as well, loves him, depends on him. You may have noted Mr. Allen's aging parents, who also were present throughout the course of the trial. They love him.

THE COURT: Of course this is a problem in a great many cases. The argument you're making has weight, but it cannot be the whole story, because for two reasons. One is that, in a very large number of cases where crimes are committed, the victims include the perpetrators having family. You could even make the argument — not without some force — that by committing a crime that is punishable by imprisonment, the perpetrator knowingly or unknowingly sets out to victimize the people he purports to love best.

That doesn't mean that I shouldn't take account of the harm to them. That is what I will do. But I want to suggest that the argument is sort of double-edged in some ways.

MR. SCHACHTER: Well, your Honor I guess I'll respond in two ways. One of, of course, 3553(a) starts with examining the characteristics of the man who has been convicted that is before your Honor for sentencing.

THE COURT: Yes. That is a good point.

The very first item in -- let me just pull it out -- Section 3553(a)(1), the court, first and foremost, is to look at, quote, the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.

The fact that those are grouped together as the primary thing that the court is told to look at shows that it is a two-edged sword.

MR. SCHACHTER: Certainly, your Honor. I will address, of course, the nature of the offense as well.

But the man that is before, it is important to understand who he is, and we think that that the letters that are submitted by friends and family, that speaks volumes about the character of Mr. Allen. Because the court is not merely judging the offense conduct — that's obviously a very important component, and I will address that — but also the question is what kind of penalty is appropriate for this man.

To determine that, we submit that your Honor needs to understand -- and we have tried to paint a picture of the man --

THE COURT: Unless the government thinks otherwise, I

think you have established, the defense has established, that Mr. Allen is, in most respects, a good person. He is clearly a good family man. He is someone who doesn't engage in ostentation or excesses. He has many commendable qualities, all of which I think are important to sentencing, and all of which I will take account of.

The government focuses on a different aspect. They point out that, you know, the people who wrote these letters, of course, were not present and they didn't see the evidence. The evidence, in the court's view, to be frank, was very strong. While otherwise leading a blameless life, Mr. Allen chose to commit -- and over a period of time, not just a one-time deal -- a serious crime.

The government also argues that he lied about it on the stand, but I noticed they didn't ask for an obstruction of justice calculation in that respect, and I am not going to make such a finding, but the jury could, and that is inherit in the verdict.

Let me just pause, though, and see if the government agrees about what I have just said about the character of Mr. Allen.

MR. YOUNG: We agree as far as Mr. Allen's home life and the way he interacts with his neighbors. We would submit that there are aspects of this crime which present a different side of his character.

THE COURT: Back to you, Mr. Schachter.

MR. SCHACHTER: Well, I think that one thing that your Honor has said is very important, and that is that other than -- I don't recall your Honor's exact words -- but other than the conduct which was considered by the jury, we submit that the record shows that Mr. Allen has led a model life of integrity and kindness and caring, and we think that his family circumstances are certainly considerations that the court should consider.

THE COURT: I agree. The word "model" may be a little strong. I think I used the word blameless. But I agree that those are all things I need to factor in.

MR. SCHACHTER: Putting aside -- I'll take that next -- the specific LIBOR-related conduct, there are also letters which demonstrates Mr. Allen's conduct in the workplace. His former coworkers wrote on his behalf, and they spoke to his integrity in the workplace as well. We obviously need to speak about the LIBOR-related conduct, but his coworkers say he was, was, a person of integrity in the workplace. He was no different to his colleagues than he was to his family and friends, that they all looked to him as being a person of virtue and integrity.

In assessing the characteristics of the defendant, we submit, your Honor, that is very important, as well as the fact that Mr. Allen has never had a brush with the law. There is no

dispute to that, and as the ABA Task Force noted, that is a factor which should be considered in determining whether a jail sentence is warranted, as well as its length. It is different. I think, your Honor, many times — not always — but many times when —

THE COURT: The last I checked, the ABA task force doesn't make the law of the hand, much as they hope to.

MR. SCHACHTER: Or should. Or should.

Jail is a very serious penalty, and we need to consider whether, as a society, under what circumstance that is a penalty which needs to be imposed. And I think that --

THE COURT: I am not sure how far that cuts. I basically agree with that point, but I would note, just so that it is out there, for better or worse, we are a highly punitive society. We throw people in jail for offenses that are trivial compared to anything that was committed in this case.

We have 2.2 million people in prison or jail right now, the so-called mass incarceration. That is by far the highest percentage and the highest absolute number of any country in the world, civilized or uncivilized.

If all were to look at it with a cold, cynical point of view, one would have to say that the American society has chosen jail as its preferred approach to crime.

MR. SCHACHTER: I think that is right, and I think that many question whether or not that is a reasonable approach

that accomplishes anything at all. That is a subject for discussion another time.

I think that I have found, as a prosecutor, your

Honor, that generally what causes somebody to be prosecuted and incarcerated is not always, but very frequently it has been a life of corner-cutting, a life of mild cheating, that has brought this person within the government's focus. Not always, but frequently. Here, there is no such evidence. The evidence is to the contrary. These letters tell a contrary story, and I think that that matters.

We also note, as we did in our papers, that Mr. Allen waived extradition. He voluntarily came here immediately to answer these charges when he could have fought the government in a lengthy extradition battle. Who knows how that would have turned out, but it deserves consideration by your Honor in what we submit is a complicated, a very difficult sentence.

Now, I would like to turn to the offense. I submit, your Honor, that there are important things about this particular offense that make it different than almost any other fraud offense that has come before the court or that the court has experienced. I am going to try to take the court through the many ways in which this offense is significantly different.

The first, most glaring, and I think the factor that is most worthy of the court's weighty consideration, is that this offense was not committed for personal gain. It resulted

in no personal gain. The only conceivable motive was to help one's employer. That doesn't excuse illegal conduct.

THE COURT: Well, what makes you think that is so unlawful? When we get to crime in the suites, as it is sometimes referred to, often there is no direct gain. But by doing a "good job," meaning one that leads to greater profits or greater enhancement of advantages or whatever, depending on the case, for the company, the defendant also advances his own future in the company, sometimes directly through bonuses, but sometimes indirectly, just through achieving an enhanced position. I am not so sure that is so unusual.

MR. SCHACHTER: I submit that a vast majority of the fraud, while certainly there are the kinds of cases, I am going to distinguish those from Mr Allen's circumstance, but I submit that a vast majority of the fraud cases that your Honor sees that are prosecuted are motivated by greed. It is somebody who has set out to defraud somebody else to put money in their pocket. That is what they are out to do. It is venal.

THE COURT: This is not a debate we need to have, because whether it is common or uncommon, I understand the distinction you're making.

But, for example, all the people who were involved in the mortgage fraud cases, that most of whom were not prosecuted, but all of whom were doing deeds that led to the prosecution of their companies, were seeking to advance the

economic position of the company. They weren't putting money directly in their pocket by doing that, they were helping their company with its profitability in ways that, at least so far as the company was concerned, were later determined to be fraudulent.

I think it is a different motivation, if you will, that is what we are really talking about here. There are people who go out and commit economic crimes so that they can get rich and because they are greedy, but there are a meaningful number of people who commit economic crimes because it advances their position in terms of the company or financial institution or whatever that they are a part of. This may be the latter type, but I think both cases exist in some numbers.

MR. SCHACHTER: As your Honor noted, individuals, in the example that the court provided, were not prosecuted criminally. There are civil regulatory agencies that may pursue individuals in those matters. The use of the criminal hammer is for the most egregious cases, because the government has a range of weapons. Not all are appropriate for every circumstance. As a general matter, because the criminal hammer can result in somebody's incarceration, I think it should be reserved for the most venal.

In assessing venality, I think it is fair to look to the motivation and is this someone who was greedy and who was acting to harm others or to put their money in their own

pockets or was this a different motivation. I think it is a relevant factor. I submit it is a relevant factor. I think it is a rare circumstance where it is not motivated by personal gain that --

THE COURT: Just so we can move on, I agree with you, it is a relevant factor. We can debate how rare or unrare that kind of situation is, but the point from your purposes is simply that this was not a crime, in your view, that was committed for personal gain.

MR. SCHACHTER: Yes. Just to address the government's response that they submitted on that, that they have said in their papers, that, well, maybe it was done to benefit the overall, the bank's bonus pool. I wish to say there is no evidence of that whatsoever. Mr. Robson did not say that he was motivated to honor Mr. Yagami's request because he was considering the bank's bonus pool. There is no e-mails, no recorded conversations in which anybody is saying, well, look, it is really important that we do what the swap traders want because we need to improve the bank's overall bonus pool. And any of these particular swaps, the impact that a single-panel bank could have had on any particular swap, it would be so small as to not have any possible impact on a bonus pool.

I just wish to address the government's argument in that papers. That would be pure speculation and nothing but. There is no basis to suggest that the defendants would have

been doing anything or motivated by anything other than to assist their employer in what, I submit, is a, perhaps, misguided -- the court would certainly say very misguided --effort to do their job. (Continued on next page) 

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MR. SCHECHTER: But it's to benefit, it's to help their employer not, to line their own pockets. I think that's a relevant factor and I know I've taken -- the Court has heard me on that.

So I ask the question. Why, if there is no personal gain, why did cash traders ever -- what's the motive? With no apparent pecuniary motive, why did cash traders ever take into account the swap trader's requests? Why were the swap traders making these requests? What's important and what I think is unique about this case is the nature of the offense. not just happen at Rabobank. The government's deferred prosecution agreements with financial institutions have revealed that identical if not far more significant conduct that was before this Court was engaged in by more than 125 people at ten different financial institutions. That's all There is no dispute between the government and we that the exact same thing happened everywhere and that's just 125 that the government sought to list in their deferred prosecution agreements and CFTC resolutions and all that. So it's clearly far more than that number.

Why did that happen? Why did the Deputy Governor of the Bank of England call Barclays and tell them to put their rates lower than they otherwise would because they did not want the market to be worried that Barclays was having trouble borrowing money? In other words, the Deputy Governor of the

Bank of England says to Barclay submit a false LIBOR rate, they direct them to submit a false LIBOR rate. And why did this happen? Why was it so widespread? And I submit, your Honor, that there was something different about the nature of this offense than any other fraud offense. I submit, your Honor, that the lines here, the enormous widespread nature of this practice, so as to really become — it's an industry practice, is explained because the lines here were blurrier, that when the Deputy Governor of the Bank of England calls Barclay and says lower your rates, there's something about it that is not obvious that it's wrongful, or we can conclude that hundreds of people, certainly more than 125 people went to work every day in the city of London and they thought to themselves today I'm intentionally committing fraud. This is what I do, this is my job.

THE COURT: I don't know why you think this is so unusual. Again, I take the analogy of the mortgage bank security bubble. So everyone who was, for example, soliciting someone who they knew really did not qualify for a mortgage to put false statements down on their mortgage application so that the mortgage could be obtained, which could then be part of a pool that could be sold as securities to people who were misled into believing that the risk was a lot less than it was, everyone who did that knew at a minimum that what was being put down in that mortgage application was not true; the person

submitting it knew it was not true and the person soliciting knew it was not true. And there were all sorts of pressures, economic and otherwise, that were pushing hundreds of people to do that. But it wasn't because they were personally pocketing money when they obtained that signature on that application.

MR. SCHECHTER: Your Honor, but that's another example where no one has been criminally prosecuted.

overstatement but second of all, I'm not sure that matters. The question you were raising was why do people do this and what I'm suggesting to you that common experience and recent experience suggests that the kinds of situations you're describing are not so unusual. And one doesn't have to just dwell with the -- you can think of the S and L crisis where there were considerable overstatements of the risk of things that savings and loan associations were engaged in and it was very widespread. In fact, it was so widespread that there the Department of Justice in an era when it had a different view of who should be prosecuted, successfully prosecuted 800 people, virtually none of whom were lining their pockets directly in the sense that you've been referring to.

So I'm not persuaded yet that this is such an unusual or unique situation.

MR. SCHECHTER: Well, your Honor, my point is, what I'm attempting to do, and obviously I'm not doing a very good

job --

THE COURT: You always do a good job, Mr. Schechter. Don't worry about that.

MR. SCHECHTER: What I'm attempting to do, your Honor, is suggest to the Court that not all offenses are the same and that there's something about the nature of this offense as indicated by its widespread nature and other factors as well, which perhaps I'll have better luck with the Court in suggesting that there is something about the nature of this offense which is different than most criminal offenses.

Perhaps I failed with the widespread nature.

Let me point out this. This occurred out in the open. There was no effort to conceal it. The unanimous testimony of all the witnesses in this case as well as is laid out in all the government's corporate prosecutions, no one tried to conceal this. This happened out in the open. The head of treasury at Rabobank sat directly across from Mr. Allen. There was nothing, there was no efforts to conceal, there was no efforts to — there was no clandestine meetings at which the plan was hatched —

THE COURT: I think while there's some element of truth to what you're saying here, I think the testimony at trial shows this was not known, for example, to the people on the other side who were relying on LIBOR as an objective measure.

MR. SCHECHTER: Certainly true. But my point is this:

That in -- my suggestion is that the lines were blurrier here

because if people thought to themselves, if all 125 of these

people; Mr. Allen, Mr. Conti, thought they were doing something

wrong, that it would be an odd thing to do to have every day,

as Mr. Robson said, there would be a shout, okay, "Who needs

this for LIBOR?" It's an odd thing to do if people are

knowingly, intentionally committing a --

THE COURT: I think it would help, to have a further debate, you are bound as I am bound by the jury's verdict. The jury found that this was an intentional fraud. I personally think the evidence of that was strong. I don't disagree with the jury in any respect. But you are bound by it even if you did disagree with it.

MR. SCHECHTER: My point is not to suggest -- I'm not here to quarrel with the jury's verdict. That's not my point. My point is that not all criminal offenses are the same and not all criminal offenses warrant the same penalty and I think there is a difference when the evidence shows that somebody is going 70 through a stoplight as somebody is walking across the street and what I'm suggesting is that there are facts and circumstances about this offense, your Honor, which suggests that the lines were blurrier, that the nature of the offense is different than some.

For example, your Honor, we have studied carefully

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your Honor's opinion in the case of Rajat Gupta. When Rajat Gupta leaves the Goldman Sachs board room and calls Raj Rajaratnam to tip him about Warren Buffet's investment, there is no question that he knows he is engaged in a criminal act. There is no question that he is engaged in what your Honor described as an egregious breach of trust. No question. He can't have any doubt.

There are facts about this which suggests that this offense is less venal, and there's indicators -- which I am probably unsuccessfully trying to lay out for the Court. enormously widespread. It is done out in the open. cares who hears. It is internally audited at Rabobank. brought to their attention that Mr. Yaqami is making requests to Mr. Robson of what LIBOR submissions should be put in. Internal audit sees it, doesn't care, does nothing. reports to the British Bankers Association that this is happening. There are regular reports. The British Bankers Association is aware, the Financial Supervisory Authority in the UK is aware of it. Mr. Allen, we heard the tape, callid the Federal Reserve investigators and says that LIBOR rates are being influenced by swap trader requests and the Fed also does nothing about it.

My point is not that they're not guilty. I'm not here to quarrel -- there may some another day --

THE COURT: I understand you're not waiving any of

your appellate rights.

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MR. SCHECHTER: But that's not my point. My point is I am submitting to your Honor, as your Honor compares it to other offenses, there are odd things about this offense which suggests that the lines are blurrier and it is an offense that should be considered different from most fraud offenses which come before the Court and I think are relevant for consideration of sentencing.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. SCHECHTER: Mr. Allen doesn't pay cash bribes. doesn't destroy evidence. There's nothing being done by anybody to conceal the conduct. I think that is a window to the state of mind of the people that are engaged in this practice. Mr. Robson never said he did anything to hide it. Ι think it is a window to the state of mind of the people that are engaged in this conduct. It is worthy of the Court's consideration of the venality, of the seriousness of the offense. And I don't mean to suggest when I say that, that it's not serious. That's not my point. My point is, that as your Honor compares all of the defendants that your Honor has sentenced I think these are relevant factors to compare and contrast and it will be my request that your Honor consider a non-custodial sentence. I'm trying to lay out the factors which would support the imposition of such a sentence.

Another factor. Lee Stewart, the government's witness

who the government clearly believes is a truth teller, they entered into a cooperation agreement, they called him to the witness stand and presented his testimony before the jury. He said that it wasn't considered inappropriate. His understanding was that it wasn't considered inappropriate at Rabobank to engage in this conduct. He was asked: "Between 2005 and 2009 you never thought about or you never really considered whether sharing your LIBOR preferences with cash traders was appropriate or inappropriate? That didn't cross your mind?

- "A. At Rabobank it wasn't considered inappropriate to do that.
- "Q. When you left the bank in 2009, you had no inkling that LIBOR submissions at Rabobank were an issue or a problem?

  "A. No."

This is the government's witness. They believed that man was telling the truth as he stood on the witness stand and he says I didn't -- he didn't see it. It did not cross his mind that this was inappropriate conduct.

Again, my point is not that no offense was committed. My point is, that as your Honor compares Mr. Allen to the many defendants that your Honor has sentenced, that is worthy of the Court's consideration that the government's own witness didn't see it. My point is that the lines were blurrier.

There are not many frauds, none that I can think of where there have been individual prosecutions -- I'm trying to

distinguish the mortgage-backed securities example that your

Honor has provided — there are not — I cannot think of frauds

where the conduct occurs across an entire industry at every

financial institution out in the open with the knowledge of

regulators, being discussed with regulators. It's just

different. That's my point.

There are other things that I think are different about this offense than others. And I will note, by the way, your Honor, I'm sure your Honor will be aware that there were a number of brokers who were charged with LIBOR manipulation in the United Kingdom and they were acquitted.

THE COURT: Yes, but of course Mr. Hayes was convicted. Every case was different and I don't think we can draw the -- I think there's one important aspect of the Hayes sentence that I want to ask the government about, but I'll flag it right now because you were the one who raised it. You stated and as near as I was able to check it out it appears to be correct, that under British law, while his sentence was nominally eleven years, originally 14 and then reduced to 11, in fact he will only serve 5-1/2 years in prison and he will be released to the community for the other 5-1/2 years.

I was really taken aback when I learned that because it reminds me a little bit of the system that the U.S. did away with, the parole system where a judge could say, oh, I'm sentencing you to 15 years but in reality in most cases,

particularly in white collar cases, it would be five years because under the law then he could be paroled after one-third of his sentence.

British law as far as I can determine, it goes even further. They mandate that you be released after one-half of your sentence unless you've committed some other offense or something like that. So the reality was that Mr. Hayes, who I think everyone agrees was in various respects more culpable than either defendant here, received a sentence in fact of 5-1/2 years.

MR. SCHECHTER: That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: I'll hear from the government on that in a minute. We need to hear from the government, so I'll ask you to bring it to a conclusion.

MR. SCHECHTER: I will attempt to do so. My only point in mentioning the broker's acquittal, watchers of that trial reported that the view was the LIBOR system was broken well in advance of the conduct and that was the reason for the acquittal. Again, my point is just that the lines here are blurrier.

A couple of other facts that I think make this one different than the vast majority of the cases your Honor sees is -- I'm not trying to excuse it, I'm merely trying to distinguish it among other defendants convicted of fraud offenses. The deceived parties were sophisticated swap

participants, most of whom were in financial institutions engaged in exactly the same conduct. The government is unable to in this unusual case identify any loss suffered by any counter party and we think that makes it different and supports a non-custodial sentence. That's not it. We think that Mr. Allen's involvement in the offense is more limited and that is also worthy of the Court's consideration.

Mr. Allen, the government recounts in its papers, his job was to, was the supervision of the bank's liquidity. The LIBOR submissions is not part of what he supervised. It is not what he did on a regular basis. It is not the heart of what he did each and every day. That's because LIBOR submitting we all learned is a simple task. It takes a couple of minutes. It does not require any interaction with a supervisor and that was the testimony of Mr. Yagami, Mr. Stewart and Mr. Robson, all of whom testified that Mr. Allen did not supervise their LIBOR submissions, he didn't supervise Mr. Stewart at all.

He would submit U.S. dollar LIBOR on extremely rare occasions. The testimony was a couple of times a year. He would submit LIBOR only when Mr. Conti and Mr. Robbins were out of the office. It would make sense that it would only be on those occasions that anybody would be directing their request to Mr. Allen as opposed to somebody else.

And that's it. We have the recorded calls and there is no recorded calls beyond these 14 -- these 16 e-mails to

which Mr. Allen responds only four times. That's the extent of the conduct. There is no recorded call making a request. My point is only that Mr. Allen's -- worthy of consideration by the Court, is his limited involvement in this offense.

THE COURT: All right. I'm going to need to cut you off. We've gone over an hour.

MR. SCHECHTER: Your Honor, I have one more point which I really think is very important.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

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MR. SCHECHTER: And that is that your Honor I think needs to consider the disparities between, Mr. Allen stands before the Court and Mr. Conti's response submission laid out in chapter and verse identical and much worse conduct committed by others at other financial institutions, and I think it is fair consideration for the Court in fashioning a sentence to consider this disparity. Why is it -- and we're six years into the government's investigation -- why is it that -- is it fair that Mr. Allen and Mr. Conti are the only ones in the United States to go to prison for this conduct when the government is aware of these more than 125 others? Is his conduct worse than the senior executive at Barclays who headed the FX and money market committee who said in a conversation with Mr. Ewan that Barclays was dirty clean? Is it worse than RBS's global head of money market that talked about keeping LIBOR down because of big fixes in London? Is it worse than UBS's head of short-term

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interest rate trading who agreed it was UBS's, quote, natural right to reflect our interest in the LIBOR fixing process?

And one of the factors is to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. And this is a gross disparity, your Honor, and I think that looking at all of these people who engaged in identical conduct, and who will never be brought before the Court, will never risk incarceration, I think that is a very significant factor for your Honor to consider in fashioning Mr. Allen's sentence.

Your Honor mentioned Mr. Hayes, and as your Honor noted, there is no comparison between Mr. Hayes' conduct and the conduct here. Mr. Hayes paid cash bribes to brokers in order to disseminate false market information and he obstructed justice. He told a witness to leave the United States in order to avoid being interviewed by the Justice Department. There is no comparison, theres nothing like that in the conduct before your Honor. There is no comparison and I wish to emphasize that if your Honor does impose a custodial sentence, that the Bureau of Prisons will place Mr. Allen and Mr. Conti in harsher conditions, much harsher conditions, your Honor. We attached several reports of the conditions that exist in private prisons which the Bureau of Prisons will subject them to and that consequence of your Honor's sentence is worthy of The fact that placing them in prison will be consideration. different and worse and harder than any other, than other

defendants, other U.S. citizen defendants that your Honor will sentence. That is simply because they're foreign nationals. They will be ineligible for a minimum security or a low security designation. Instead they will be sent to these institutions, these privately run institutions where there is no education, there are none of the rehabilitative opportunities that exist in the prisons simply because they're foreign nationals and that's not fair and it's harsh.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. Let me hear from the government.

MR. YOUNG: Your Honor, I think the lines were clear. The lines were not blurry. When Mr. Allen got up and testified he didn't say I thought it was okay to influence this rate to suit our trader positions. He said I understand that you can't do that. And that's what Mr. Robson said, that's what Mr. Stewart said that's what Mr. Yagami said. I would submit that it's obvious. I mean, if you are manipulating a rate it's a zero sum game when it's a swap. Somebody else on the other end of the swap is going to lose out.

The biggest problem with the crime, Judge, I looked at what the Court said in sentencing Mr. Gupta and the Court there observed: "The effect of the crime is to place in jeopardy the integrity of the marketplace which is one of the most valuable assets this country possesses; in an even broader sense to suggest cynicism about how the financial markets work and how

business is conducted. Once you have a situation where people say well, it's all rigged, it's all fixed, it's all a bunch of people with inside information getting rich at the expense of the rest of us, you create cynicism that is terribly hard to overcome." And that's the problem with this case. By rigging this market the defendants not only undermined the integrity of the market, but they harmed public confidence in those markets. And that is a very real and non-theoretical problem. Because if people don't have confidence in the markets they're not going to invest their money. That is the single biggest problem with this case, your Honor.

It is certainly the case that there are other people out there manipulating the LIBOR rate. I mean, there were other prosecutions, there were deferred prosecution agreements. And what that shows, your Honor, is that there are a lot of people who if given that opportunity, if given the opportunity to rig a benchmark in their favor, they're going to do it. And while a deferred prosecution agreement and a corporate fine can have very helpful consequences in deterring that conduct the fact this conduct is so pervasive and that many institutions that have entered into TPAs for rigging LIBOR had people continue on and rig the FX file. I think what that teaches us is that no deterrence short of incarceration is going to deter people from taking advantage of those situations.

THE COURT: So in light of that, what do you say to

the argument that why hasn't the government gone after a lot more individuals?

MR. YOUNG: Well, I would say a couple of things.

Mr. Shechter's argument assumes that we're done investigating and this is the end of the story as far as LIBOR is concerned.

And while I can't make any representations about what may or may not happen tomorrow, what I can tell you is that this is not the end of the story. If we come across another case of LIBOR manipulation, we think it's a good case we believe beyond a reasonable doubt that it will be proven, that's a case that we can bring. So I think it's probably more fair to say that the defendants are on the earlier end of the individual prosecutions than some other folks.

I would also note, Judge, we have charged, the

Department of Justice has charged a number of people in this

case. We charged Tom Hayes as well. He was prosecuted in the

United Kingdom. There was a guy named Mr. Darren who is

residing in Switzerland and a number of the ICAP brokers who

were acquitted. But what's also important is that the United

Kingdom has charged 24 individuals. So when we make

prosecuting decisions we have to decide is this a good use of

taxpayer dollars, is there another sovereign that's going after

these same people, does it make sense for two sovereigns to

chase after the same folks?

THE COURT: I believe there's still a fugitive in this

very case. Do I have that right or not?

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MR. YOUNG: You do have that right. There are two other people. Mr. Thompson is in Australia. We've also charged Mr. Motomura. It's simply not the case that we decided to charge Mr. Allen and Mr. Conti for some personal animus. We went after the conspiracy the best way we knew how to do it.

And, Judge, there was a guilty plea of a Deutsche Bank trader not long ago in this very courthouse.

At the trial it was certainly true that both defendants had family members that came. They came all the way across the ocean, they sat in on the trial and the Court had a window of their friends and their family in the letters that were written. And I remember we thought to ourselves if these defendants have family members that are willing to support them in such a difficult and trying circumstances, they must have done something right and that is certainly probative of 3553. But here's the problem. The problem is that people who are in a position to rig the FX file or to rig a LIBOR benchmark by and large are similarly situated to these defendants when it comes to having family members, when it comes to having people who care about them. And what I would urge the Court to remember -- while there may be no dispute that these defendants are well liked in their communities and they have beautiful families that support them, it should be noted that their offense was not an aberration in the sense that they got up

almost every morning and participated in a scheme that went on a number of different years. And that's an important distinction we think to draw. And so --

THE COURT: It's also a distinction with the Gupta case, for example, where it was a single, one-time violation.

MR. YOUNG: It is. This wasn't somebody who had a lifetime of trading that made a bad trade. This is the way they did business. And I think another helpful part of the Gupta decision is that the Court said the offense, the way these people, the defendant committed the offense that's probative of their character, too. And the problem with this case is that you have two defendants that decided that they wanted to engage in conduct which they knew full well would underline the credibility of the LIBOR benchmark and cause people to question the integrity of the markets. They knew that that would happen and they decided to go forward with that scheme anyway. They subordinated the most important numbers in the financial universe to simply gain an edge on their counter parties.

(Continued next page)

MR. YOUNG: Judge, what we have is sad situation.

What we are asking the court to do will no doubt have terrible consequences on the defendant's family. I am glad we don't hold the gavel today, but we think for the purposes of deterrence, a custodial sentence is warranted and it is necessary.

THE COURT: I wanted to ask you, just to make sure that there is no disagreement because it may be relevant, that is, do you disagree that under the British sentencing system, Mr. Hayes' effective prison sentence was five and a half years?

MR. YOUNG: I don't want to hold myself out as an expert. I don't know if it is five and a half. I would agree, everything I know about their system says that a defendant, if they have good behavior, will serve significantly less time than the time to which they are sentenced.

THE COURT: What I am relying on here is a publication of the government of the United Kingdom, complete with a beautiful logo of the crown. It appears at www.gov.uk/typesofprisonsentence, and it says: If a sentence is for 12 months or more, the first half of the sentence is in prison and the second half is in the community.

I have no reason to think that is other than what the law is in the U.K.

MR. YOUNG: I don't either. I don't either.

Judge, I guess I don't want to impose too much more

time on the court. I would like to address one more last point on the question of why not more prosecutions. There is a number of reasons, but one of the answers is, these are really difficult cases. They are hard cases to take forward. They are hard cases to detect.

We have a number of authorities, <u>Gupta</u> included, which say when you have a crime that is difficult to prosecute and a crime that is difficult to detect, that requires a relatively stiff punishment, to change the calculus of the would-be offender.

Judge, unless the court has any questions you would like me to address, we would submit on the papers, and thank you for all the energy you spent on the case.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Let me hear from the defendant, if he wishes to be heard.

THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, over the last three years, was involved in the investigation of the trial against me. I have constantly asked myself what I should have done differently. Over the past two years, I have read and re-read over and over again the e-mails I sent and received.

I so wish that when requested, the stock trades were communicated to me, I would have just said, no, stop. I wish that after receiving a request, I would have gone to compliance or done something more to stop it. I live with that regret

every day of my life. I wish I was more tuned in, that my sense of judgment was different.

If only I had done something more, my family might be spared in all this plague, the weight that I will carry with me forever. To think that these failings may lead me to be separated from my daughters is unbearable. The idea that they may not experience the same type of childhood that I did, where they are safe and secure with a father who is present and loving, the grief is just overwhelming.

Your Honor, the last three years have taken a huge toll on myself and my family. It has been truly punishing time. I have suffered from anxiety and depression and sought counseling to help me cope with the situation that I find myself in. I do not feel I am the same person that I once was, but I am consumed with worry about my family's future and what it may hold.

I never stop thinking about the punishing effect it has had on my partner, my children, my elderly parents, and on their health. My partner Tracy and I have been together for 25 years and enjoy a strong, loving relationship built on trust, respect, and honesty. Tracy has been extremely supportive during this period. This has been incredibly hard on her, and the potential of a life apart from each other and the thought of bringing up our children on her own.

I am so concerned with the effect this has had and

continues to have on my two young daughters. I can see how they have suffered already. They are no longer the happy-go-lucky, bubbly girls they were. It has affected their sleep, their school work. And I constantly ask, when will I be going? When will I come back?

I have been a full-time father for the last seven years, staying at home and rearing my children. I have formed an incredible bond with my daughters. They mean everything to me. They are still so young and emotionally vulnerable, and to be separated from them by thousands of miles in another country, their ability to have regular physical contact, or to not be there for them in their formative years is a devastating prospect for them and for me.

I plead with you to please take these effects into consideration and show leniency when you're assigning my sentence.

I thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

I want to first make reference to the law that does govern this sentence, because although I have had some flippant remarks to make about the guidelines, and the law permits me to do that, I am bound by and also very appreciative of congress' wisdom in imposing Section 3553(a) of Title 18 entitled The Imposition of Sentence.

The first factor that the court must consider under

that section, as I have mentioned earlier, is "the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant."

Now, as to the history and characteristics of the defendant, as I previously mentioned, I am persuaded that there is a great deal of good in Mr. Allen, and that in this, his day of sentence, the court needs to take account of that. I don't view that as something that is extraneous to a sentence. It is an important part of a sentence, when the whole human being in front of the court needs to be judged.

But I also agree with the government that this was a clear-cut and rather blatant fraud. Yes, it was a fraud that others had involved themselves in as well, and that is not irrelevant, but the proof beyond a reasonable doubt at that trial that showed that Mr. Allen knowingly, unlawfully, willfully, intentionally engaged in a quite serious fraud. It was a fraud in the bigger picture, as the government points out, that involved the rigging or the attempted rigging of what is one of the most important benchmarks in the financial markets. The benchmark to which billions, if not trillions, of dollars in mortgage loans, consumer debt, derivative contracts, and other financial instruments are tied. I don't want to overstate it. This was just one small part of that huge market, but the undermining of the reliability and objectivity of LIBOR is a very serious offense, and that cannot be

overlooked.

The second portion of Section 3553(a) says that the sentence needs to be sufficient but not greater than necessary to carry out four different factors. The first is to reflect the seriousness of the offense and also promote respect for the law and provide just punishment. I have already indicated that I consider this a very serious offense.

The second is to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct. Now, I don't think anyone believes that there is much need here for specific deterrence. It is very unlikely that Mr. Allen would commit this offense again. But, of course, what that provision is mainly addressed to is general deterrence. General deterrence is one of the most difficult aspects of sentencing for any judge to calculate, because the truth of the matter is that no one really knows how much a given sentence will act as a general deterrent. It would be wonderful if we could say, oh, well, a ten-year sentence deters twice as much crime out of a particular kind as a five-year sentence. No one can say that.

The studies that go back several decades all suggest that there are too many factors involved and that no one can really make an overall assessment from, if you will, a criminal logical standpoint of how a given sentence is likely to affect deterrence. That generally, therefore, cuts in favor of a lesser sentence or no sentence, because if you can't make a

determination of how much deterrence there is going to be, how can you use that as a factor to impose something as serious as a criminal term.

However, there is a body of literature, much of it going back several decades to the works of Gilbert Geis, who was one of the major figures in this area for many decades, now unhappily deceased, that suggest what common sense would also suggest, which is that some prison time does have a deterrent effect that a complete absence of prison time does not. Just thinking about it in common sense terms, if there were never any prison term for any crime, there is no doubt that crime would run rampant.

It is a particularly strong deterrent, Mr. Geis' studies suggest, in the white-collar area because people who commit white-collar crimes, particularly of the sort that Mr. Allen committed -- as to say is distinct from professional con men or things like that -- are people to whom prison and the very thought of prison is so antithetical to the way their lives have developed, that even the possibility of going to prison is more likely to have a deterrent effect in their cases than, say, in the case of some drug addict or person who is from a more crime-ridden background.

At the same time, I am aware of nothing that suggests that that effect, that deterrent, effect on white-collar criminals of prison sentences cannot be achieved through

relatively short sentences. I think there are no studies that suggest the opposite, that huge, big sentences will serve a general deterrent effect in white-collar cases that is not substantially served by short sentences.

I have imposed, on occasion, long sentences in white-collar cases. I sentenced an attorney named Mark Dreier to 20 years, but had nothing to do with the belief that that was going to achieve a greater deterrence than if I had sentenced him to two years. It had everything to do with the fact that, unlike Mr. Allen, he was a despicable human being who had spent much of his adult life involved in fraudulent activity. But on the issue of deterrence, it seems to me the beginning of wisdom in the white-collar area, that some prison time has an important deterrent effect, but a lot of prison time doesn't add very much.

A related aspect of this is a statement that appeared in the government's memorandum in this case involving Mr. Allen that I thought was very well-spoken. It is at page five. It says, "The LIBOR and foreign exchange manipulation scandals have exposed a culture of cheating on the trading desk of many of the world's largest financial institutions that can be checked only by the incarceration of wrongdoers."

I think that is right. I am mystified that in some of the recent history of the past, that approach was apparently not taken, and only the institutions were gone after. But also

the Deputy Attorney General has indicated that that's the policy of the past, not the policy of the present.

In any event, here we have a case where the individuals have been charged, and one cannot ignore, I think, to my mind, the almost common sense observation that punishing individuals with some prison time is infinitely more likely to have a deterrent effect on widespread misconduct than extracting monies from corporate parents, usually at the cost of their innocent shareholders.

The third factor under Section 2 of Section 3553(a) is to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant. I see nothing to indicate there will be any further crimes by Mr. Allen.

educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment. This is irrelevant, other than in the sense that Mr. Schachter brought to the court's attention that Mr. Allen may not qualify under Bureau of Prison policies for the kind of institution that someone in his position would normally be sent. I don't think, when all is said and done, that is a major factor one way or the other, but it is a factor that bears a little bit in Mr. Allen's favor, or in the notion that the sentence should be lower than it might otherwise be.

The third factor under Section 3553(a) is the kind of sentences available. I don't think we need to say anymore

about that.

The fourth factor is the kinds of sentencing range established by the sentencing commission. Well, I have already expressed my tepid views on that subject.

The fifth factor is any policy statement of the sentencing commission. I don't know that there is any that bears on this particular situation.

The sixth is the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities. Now, this is always a very difficult thing to assess, because every case is different. When a case is not before the same judge, you only have indirect knowledge, at best, of the facts. Nevertheless, I think everyone here agrees that Mr. Hayes' misconduct was more severe and culpable than that of either Mr. Allen or Mr. Conti, and that is why I was struck by the fact that his sentence was five and a half years.

In my mind that, so far as disparities are concerned, suggests that Mr. Allen's sentence has to be substantially below that, but that is just one factor.

Then the seventh factor, the last factor, is the need to provide restitution. I don't believe that is involved in this case. Let me just be sure of that, insofar as the government is concerned.

MR. YOUNG: It is not involved in this case.

THE COURT: Very good.

There are a lot of other factors that are implicit in

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those seven factors that I just mentioned. I have already said about the family. My heart goes out to the family of Mr. Allen and Mr. Conti. It is one of the many terrible things about prison terms, that the victims are often the families of the incarcerated. I mentioned before the mass incarceration for which this country suffers, to its shame, to its total shame, but of those 2.2 million people in prison right now, an amount that has stayed more or less steady or increased over the last 25 years, even as crime rates have gone steadily down, 40 percent of them are young black males. The effect on their families, on their entire communities, is tragic. This is something that the court must consider in this case, the effect on Mr. Allen's family, and when we get to the next sentence, to Mr. Conti's family, because it would be barbaric to say that because we are ruining the lives of black families, we should also ruin the lives of white families. Obviously the right lesson is to reduce the sentences in the other cases.

When I weigh all these things together, I come to the conclusion that there must be prison time here. The offense is too serious. You can't go around as, in my view, both Mr. Allen and Mr. Conti were doing, and helping rig one of the most important markets in the world and not pay the price. And deterrence, in the limited sense I have mentioned, is also important, but I think a great many other factors cut in favor of a modest sentence.

The sentence of the court is that the defendant is sentenced to 24 months on each of the 19 counts to run concurrently. 24 months. I see no need for supervised release and the probation office does not recommend supervised release to follow prison. I am also persuaded by the defense submissions that no fine is appropriate in this case. There is, however, a special assessment of \$100 on each of the counts that must be paid for a total of \$1,900 mandatory special assessment.

I don't know that any forfeiture is involved, is it?

MR. YOUNG: We are not seeking forfeiture.

THE COURT: Very good.

The sentence is pretty much straight across the board, two years, 24 months.

Now, before I advise the defendant of his right of appeal, is there anything either counsel needs to raise for the court?

MR. YOUNG: Not from the government, your Honor.

MR. SCHACHTER: Your Honor, I don't know if this is the appropriate time. We would ask for a recommendation from the court. Would the court like to hear that now?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. SCHACHTER: We ask that court include in the judgment and recommendation, our hope is to avoid one of these privately contracted facilities, and so we ask that the court

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recommend that the defendant be designated to FCI Allenwood, which is pretty close to Newark. And while travel and visitation will be very difficult given that his family resides in the U.K., it will be made easier through that recommendation.

THE COURT: Just let me stop. I am perfectly happy to make that recommendation and will. I am sure you have told your client that, of course, I can only recommend, I cannot order that. The Bureau of Prisons makes the determination.

MR. SCHACHTER: Yes, your Honor.

We would also ask that the court recommends that Mr. Allen not be designated to one of the Bureau of Prisons' privately contracted facilities. We ask for that recommendation. We don't know that it will be of assistance, your Honor, but --

THE COURT: I am happy to make that recommendation. I think there is a lot of literature that suggests that the private prisons and their ownership have become one of the leading lobbies for the continuation of mass incarceration in this country, but maybe that is unfair, they are not here to protest. But I will make that other recommendation.

MR. SCHACHTER: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Allen, you have a right to appeal this sentence. Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.

THE COURT: If you can't afford counsel for any 1 appeal, the court will appoint one for you free of charge. 2 3 understand that? 4 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 5 THE COURT: Let's turn to Mr. Conti. 6 MR. WILLIAMSON: Thank you, your Honor. 7 Though he may not believe it himself, Mr. Schachter addressed, I think, all of the many of the issues that apply to 8 9 both defendants, and so I'll keep my comments limited to 10 Mr. Conti's individual culpability. 11 As the government has acknowledged in their sentencing submission, Mr. Conti was not the leader of the conspiracy. 12 13 Mr. Conti received no formal education in banking or finance. 14 He comes from a working class family. He entered banking 15 immediately out of secondary school, and everything he learned 16 about his responsibilities, both as a money market trader and 17 as a LIBOR submitter, he learned on the job. As the government's witnesses testified at trial, 18 accommodating trader requests was common practice at Rabobank. 19 20 THE COURT: I think, by the way -- forgive me for 21

THE COURT: I think, by the way -- forgive me for interrupting -- I think I never formally indicated that I had adopted the presentence report calculation of the guidelines in Mr. Conti's case, as I did Mr. Allen's case.

MR. WILLIAMSON: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

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MR. WILLIAMSON: As the government's witnesses testified, accommodating trader requests was common practice at Rabobank as early as the year 2000, at least five years before Mr. Conti was given any responsibility over LIBOR submissions. They also testified that they engaged in this practice for some time without believing it was wrong. Mr. Yagami made requests, he said, throughout 2005 and '6, and he did not come to believe it was manipulation until later. Mr. Stewart, as Mr. Schachter said, said that by the time he left the bank, he didn't realize that the practice was a problem.

Now, the jury determined that Mr. Conti engaged in this conduct knowing it was wrong. We respect that verdict. But as Mr. Schachter eloquently argued, these facts suggest that Mr. Conti's conduct was not the result of brazen disregard for the law that the government argues that it was, but the cultural factors were to obscure the seriousness of the conduct.

I would point out, your Honor, that Mr. Conti's conduct, as demonstrated by the evidence at trial, was not as culpable as Mr. Robson's.

THE COURT: I think the government agrees with you on that.

MR. WILLIAMSON: Thank you, your Honor.

Nor did Mr. Conti, like Mr. Stewart, have a direct proprietary interest in the LIBOR submission that's were made.

As I understand, Mr. Stewart had a proprietary contract with
LIBOR bank and made money directly of those submissions.

Again, Mr. Conti was, according to Mr. Robson's
testimony, instructed in how to submit LIBOR rates by
superiors. I would urge the court to consider all of this in
calculating Mr. Conti's relative culpability in order to avoid

THE COURT: Thank you very much. Let me hear from the government.

unwarranted sentencing disparities between Mr. Conti and the

MR. YOUNG: Your Honor, I'll rest on the papers and on my points that I made with respect to Mr. Allen, except to make two observations.

(Continued on next page)

other defendants in this matter.

MR. YOUNG: I think the distinction between Mr. Contiand Mr. Allen is, number one, Mr. Allen was in a subordinate role. I think also, we would submit that Mr. Allen was not entirely candid when he was testifying. That is a distinguishing factor with Mr. Conti, so with those distinctions, Judge, we rest on the papers and my arguments that pertain to Mr. Allen.

THE COURT: Let me hear from Mr. Conti if he wishes to be heard.

THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I will be very brief.

First, I want to thank you for your courtesy and decency throughout the trial and this process. I've never faced criminal charges before and certainly have never been put on trial. You made the process somewhat less frightening and intimidating and my family and I are grateful for that.

Secondly, I've always tried to conduct my life personally and professionally with integrity and concern for others, but I accept the verdict and the fact that you must issue a judgment. There are certain sad realities that I must come to terms with. I know that the career in banking that I spent my entire adult life building is over and I may go to prison in a country not my own far from home. But what I worry about most, your Honor, is the effect that any separation is going to have on my wife, Lisa, and my two daughters and my son.

Since I was first placed under investigation years ago their lives have been completely turned upside down. I am scared for their future. That they have gone through so much turmoil pains me more than anyone can know. Your Honor, all I want to now do is protected my family from harm and to get to a point where we can just be a family again without all this hanging over our heads, without pain, without grief. I will be extremely grateful for your consideration in allowing that day to come as soon as possible.

Thank you very much, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

with respect to the sentencing of Mr. Allen apply in Mr. Conti's case. The big difference is that under any realistic view of the situation he's less culpable. In addition, as does Mr. Allen in a different way, he has a very sympathetic background and family situation, so forth, all of which I have taken account of.

So the sentence of the Court, which I will explain more specifically in a moment, is he is sentenced to a year and a day on each of the 19 counts concurrently. No supervised release, no fine. I should say in his case it's nine counts, so -- is that right? There were fewer counts with respect to Mr. --

MR. YOUNG: We're counting eight, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay. Whatever it is. Let's see. I'm counting nine, but I'm counting counts 1, 4, 7, 8, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16. And if my fingers are correct, that's nine. Well --MR. YOUNG: I think that's right.

THE COURT: Okay. So concurrently on each of the counts, whether it's eight or nine, but I'm pretty sure it's nine, and therefore a mandatory special assessment of \$900. If it turns out there are eight counts it's \$800. We'll check that before we issue a judgment but I think it's nine. But no fine, no restitution, no forfeiture.

Now, the reason a year and a day is important is that if your sentence is a year or less you don't qualify for good time. Mr. Allen, for example, will qualify for good time and that means his sentence can be reduced at the discretion of the Bureau of Prisons by as much as 15 percent of his sentence and I wanted Mr. Conti to have that same benefit. So while otherwise I would have imposed a sentence of a year, half of the sentence I imposed on Mr. Allen, instead I'll make it a year and a day so that you will qualify for that good time reduction in the discretion of the Bureau of Prisons.

Now, before I advise Mr. Conti of his right of appeal, anything else counsel wanted to raise?

MR. WILLIAMSON: Yes, your Honor. We would make the same request of a recommendation of a designation to Allenwood.

THE COURT: I will make the exact same recommendation.

Mr. Conti, you have a right to appeal the sentence. Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do, your Honor.

THE COURT: If you can't afford counsel for the appeal the Court will appoint one for you free of charge. Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: I do.

THE COURT: Very good. All right. Anything else counsel needs to raise?

MR. YOUNG: Judge, we would ask for a modification of conditions of release.

THE COURT: What modification do you wish?

MR. YOUNG: What we would ask the Court to do is to restrict, allow the defendants to self surrender, but that they have to stay in the Southern District of New York or some other agreeable venue until they can self surrender to their facility.

THE COURT: I'm disinclined to impose that. These defendants have not shown yet any propensity to flee. They would ruin their careers forever if they did that. They would probably ruin their family life because they could be found if they simply fled back to England. They probably do need to set a prompt surrender date. Now, of course, this may be affected by any appeal. We'll worry about that if and when that occurs. But why don't we say that the defendants are, barring any

subsequent order, to surrender to the designated institution by May 2 at 2:00 p.m. All right. Anything else we need to take up?

MR. SCHECHTER: As your Honor alluded to, we do seek bail pending Mr. Allen's appeal.

THE COURT: The bail will be granted on the same conditions previously set, subject, of course to revision at any time if either side has reason to believe they are a bail risk. And I understand that the statute says about whether there's a substantial issue for appeal and all like that. Although I think technically it doesn't really kick in until the moment of surrender, but while of course like all judges think there's no issue on appeal nevertheless I think the Kastigar issue is not without some appellate interest, so I'm not going to order their immediate surrender.

MR. SCHECHTER: So, I guess, and I apologize, your Honor --

THE COURT: The government is not seeking their immediate surrender.

MR. SCHECHTER: But in terms of, our request would be that he continue on the conditions set for his release during the pendency of appeal until the Court of Appeals rules and I'm not sure --

THE COURT: So I will grant that order with the proviso that the government has the right at any time to come

before the Court and say there's new information or reasons to change that. That could even be after you file your appeal brief and maybe he'll say, Judge, they didn't even raise a colorable issue. I retain jurisdiction to change that, but for now that will be the order of the Court for both defendants. MR. SCHECHTER: Thank you, your Honor. MR. WILLIAMSON: Thank you, your Honor. THE COURT: Anything else? Thanks very much. (Adjourned)